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BRUESEWITZ V. WYETH: 
THE “UNAVOIDABLE” VACCINE 
PROBLEM 
SARA WEXLER 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
With fear of vaccines on the rise1 and the resurgence of Whooping 
Cough (Pertussis) nearing epidemic proportions in California,2 now is 
a particularly apt time for the Supreme Court to assess the National 
Childhood Vaccine Injury Act (Vaccine Act).3 Bruesewitz v. Wyeth4 
provides the Court with this opportunity. In Bruesewitz, the Court 
addresses whether federal law preempts state tort claims under the 
Vaccine Act.5 How the statutory text is interpreted—specifically 
whether the Court will interpret “unavoidable” in the Vaccine Act to 
preempt design-defect claims—will determine whether a state jury, 
rather than a special master in Vaccine Court, may decide whether a 
differently designed vaccine could have prevented the resulting side 
effects.6 
Bruesewitz’s outcome will affect more than just who will decide 
vaccine-design claims. According to the respondent Wyeth, a 
pharmaceutical company, permitting state juries to assess these claims 
will impair the vaccine market and injure the public as vaccine 
manufacturers withdraw from the market due to the rising cost of 
litigation.7 Conversely, petitioner Bruesewitz, the family of a child 
 
 J.D. Candidate, 2012, Duke University School of Law. 
 1. Brian Deer, How the Case Against the MMR Vaccine Was Fixed, 342 BRITISH MED. J. 
77 (2011); Jennifer Steinhauser, Public Health Risk Seen As Parents Reject Vaccines, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 28, 2008, at 1. 
 2. Molly Hennessy-Fiske, Whooping Cough Fight Broadens; Officials Urge More 
Vaccinations As Number of Cases Surges, L.A. TIMES, July 20, 2010, at AA 1. 
 3. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 300aa-1–300aa-34 (West 2010). 
 4. Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, No. 09-152 (U.S. argued Oct. 12, 2010). 
 5. Brief for Respondent at i, Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, No. 09-152 (U.S. July 23, 2010). 
 6. Id. at 4–5. 
 7. See id. at 55–57; Brief for American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP) et al. as Amici 
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injured by the Pertussis vaccine, views state-court liability as vital to 
compelling vaccine manufacturers to continue enhancing the safety 
and technology of vaccines.8 Although Bruesewitz has garnered 
relatively little media attention,9 the decision will have a direct and 
significant impact on the health and welfare of American children.10 
II. FACTS 
Like millions of other infants in the 1990s, Hannah Bruesewitz 
received the DPT vaccine to protect her against Diphtheria, Pertussis, 
and Tetanus.11 The Federal Advisory Committee on Immunization 
Practices recommended that children receive five doses of the DPT 
vaccine before they turn six years old.12 On April 1, 1992, an 
apparently healthy six-month-old Hannah received her third dose of 
the Wyeth Tri-Immunol DPT vaccine and experienced seizures within 
hours.13 Over the next eleven years, Hannah continued to have 
seizures; doctors diagnosed her with “pervasive developmental 
disorder and seizure disorder.”14 To this day, Hannah suffers from 
residual seizure disorder and developmental impairment;15 she 
requires “intensive high-quality one-on-one” occupational and speech 
therapy and will likely require medical care for the rest of her life.16 
In 1995, the Bruesewitz family filed a claim in Vaccine Court for 
Hannah’s DPT-related injuries.17 Established under the Vaccine Act, 
the Vaccine Court was created as part of the National Vaccine Injury 
Compensation Program (NVICP), which provides a compensation 
scheme for vaccine-related injury claims.18 The Act requires a person 
 
Curiae Supporting Respondents at 15–18, Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, No. 09-152 (U.S. July 23, 2010). 
 8. Brief for Petitioners at 51–57, Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, No. 09-152 (U.S. May 24, 2010); 
Brief for Mark Geistfeld as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 3–4, Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, 
No. 09-152 (U.S. May 24, 2010); Brief for American Association for Justice (AAJ) as Amici 
Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 10–27, Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, No. 09-152 (U.S. May 24, 2010). 
 9. A LexisNexis search of “Schwarzenegger v. Entertainment Merchants’ Association” in 
the “News, Most Recent 2 Years” database yielded 110 results and “Snyder v. Phelps” yielded 
327 articles while “Bruesewitz v. Wyeth” yielded only 81 results. 
 10. See Steinhauser, supra note 1 (citing cases in which parents have refused vaccinations 
for their children leading to deleterious health effects). 
 11. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 8, at 19. 
 12. Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, 561 F.3d 233, 236 (3d Cir. 2009). 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. at 236. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. at 237. 
 18. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300aa-10 (West 2010). 
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injured by a vaccine to bypass the civil-litigation system and pursue a 
claim in the Vaccine Court.19 It allows claimants to overcome the 
burden of causation if the vaccine in question is covered under the 
Act, if the injury is included on the Vaccine Table (Table) of 
associated injuries, and if no evidence indicates that something other 
than the vaccine caused the injury.20 If the injury is not included on the 
Table, but a claimant can prove that a vaccine caused the injury, the 
claimant may also recover in Vaccine Court.21 The claimant is free to 
accept or reject the Vaccine Court’s decision, and may then pursue 
limited claims in state or federal court.22 
The Bruesewitz family unsuccessfully pursued its claim in Vaccine 
Court. Because Hannah’s residual seizure disorder and 
encephalopathy were no longer considered “Table” injuries, the 
Vaccine Court dismissed the family’s claim without prejudice.23 To 
proceed in Vaccine Court, Bruesewitz would need to prove causation-
in-fact.24 Bruesewitz, however, chose not to proceed in Vaccine Court 
and instead sued Wyeth directly alleging the vaccine was defectively 
designed by the company’s failure to produce a safer design.25 
The district court granted summary judgment for Wyeth.26 The 
court held that the Vaccine Act preempts all design-defect claims 
against FDA-approved vaccines from vaccine injures, both in 
negligence and strict liability.27 The district court held that a case-by-
case consideration would violate Congress’s intent to protect 
manufacturers from suit.28 Bruesewitz appealed.29 
Over the last century, the federal government has assumed control 
over the vaccine industry and has required approval of all 
manufacturing, licensing, and marketing of vaccines.30 Since 1972, the 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has regulated all vaccines and 
biologics.31 To market a vaccine in the United States, the vaccine 
 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300aa-21(a) (West 2010). 
 23. Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, 561 F.3d 233, 237 (3d Cir. 2009). 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at 238. 
 29. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 8, at 2. 
 30. Id. at 4–6. 
 31. Id. at 6. 
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manufacturer must receive authorization to conduct clinical trials 
from the FDA.32 After clinical trials have been conducted, the vaccine 
sponsor may apply for a biologics license and must prove that the 
vaccine is “safe, pure, potent, and effective.”33 The vaccine is not 
required to be the safest feasible design, and the FDA does not ensure 
that drugs are optimally designed.34 Manufacturers must follow strict 
regulations and may need subsequent FDA approval to change any 
aspect of the vaccine.35 Much of the biomedical research on vaccine 
safety and innovation is performed by the federal government at the 
National Institutes of Health (NIH) and many vaccine 
recommendations and risk determinations are made by the Center for 
Disease (CDC) and other medical groups.36 While the FDA relies on 
an adverse event reporting system and post-marketing studies to 
monitor any problems with approved vaccines, the FDA does not 
have the authority to order a manufacturer to adopt a safer 
alternative design for an already-licensed vaccine.37 
Wyeth developed the Tri-Immunol vaccine to protect against 
Diphtheria, Pertussis, and Tetanus.38 The vaccine received marketing 
approval in 1943.39 It was incredibly successful in reducing the 
incidence of Pertussis in the United States.40 Although the vaccine 
carried some risks (as all vaccines do), doctors and health officials 
agreed that the benefits of the vaccine to the community outweighed 
the risks to an individual.41 Vaccination of large numbers of people 
causes “herd immunity”42 and thereby halts the spread of disease 
 
 32. 21 C.F.R. §§ 312.2(a), 312.20–312.38 (West 2011). 
 33. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 8, at 6. 
 34. Id. at 6–7; Guidance for Industry: Providing Clinical Evidence of Effectiveness for 
Human Drug and Biological Products, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 4 (May 1998), 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Guidances/
UCM078749.pdf. 
 35. 21 C.F.R. § 601.12(b) (West 2011). 
 36. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 22–23, 
Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, No. 09-152 (U.S. July 23, 2010). 
 37. 21 C.F.R. § 601.12(b)(2)(i) (West 2011); Brief for Petitioner, supra note 8, at 9. 
 38. Brief for Respondent, supra note 5, at 18. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Brief for AAP, supra note 7, at 15; Brief for Buffler, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Respondents (11 Scientists) at 13, Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, No. 09-152 (U.S. July 30, 2010). 
 42. “Herd immunity,” also known as “community immunity,” refers to the protection 
against certain diseases afforded to a given community by immunizing a high percentage of the 
community. Thus, if a few members of the community are not immunized, the community is still 
protected, as the disease will not be able to spread. If only a small percentage of the population 
is immunized, the disease could cause an outbreak. CDC Vaccine Program Office: Glossary, 
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throughout the community.43 Because of the overwhelming benefits of 
herd immunity, state governments provide and require childhood 
vaccinations for all public school students.44 
Tri-Immunol contained “whole cell” Pertussis vaccine, as well as 
Diphtheria and Tetanus toxoids, to stimulate an immune response.45 
Although some scientists suspected that whole-cell vaccines might 
cause some severe adverse reactions, several epidemiologic studies 
dismissed those concerns.46 The vaccine did have some side effects,47 
but the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) removed 
“residual seizure disorder” from the list of injuries associated with the 
DPT vaccine in 1995 due to insufficient medical evidence supporting 
a causal relationship.48 Although alternative DPT vaccines existed, 
none were available for six-month-olds at the time of Hannah’s 
inoculation. 49 
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A. The Vaccine Act 
Congress established the NVICP under the Vaccine Act in 1986.50 
Congress conceived of the program to resolve two issues. First, 
Congress wanted to provide a more efficient, consistent, and cost-
 
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., http://www.hhs.gov/nvpo/glossary1.htm (last visited 
Jan. 15, 2011). 
 43. Brief for 11 Scientists, supra note 41, at 12. 
 44. National Vaccine Program Office School Immunization Laws, CENTERS FOR DISEASE 
CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.hhs.gov/nvpo/law.htm#School%20immunization 
%20laws (last visited Jan. 15, 2011). 
 45. Brief for Respondent, supra note 5, at 18. A “whole-cell” vaccine is prepared using the 
whole inactivated bacterial cells. A toxoid refers to that inactivated cell. 
 46. Id. at 18–19. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Toner v. Lederle, 779 F.2d 1429, 1431 (9th Cir. 1986); Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, 561 F.3d 
233, 237 n.5. (3d Cir. 2009). 
 49. Though this is a point of contention for petitioners, everyone agrees that no other 
vaccine was actually on the market in the United States at the time. A “fractioned” cell vaccine 
existed in the 1970s, but the FDA refused to relicense it, so it was no longer on the market. In 
1991, the FDA approved the “accellular vaccine” for children two years or older, but did not 
approve it for younger children until 1996. As of 1992, no alternative vaccines were available for 
infants in the U.S. Toner, 779 F.2d at 1431; Bruesewitz, 561 F.3d at 236–37. Japan had adopted 
the DTaP vaccine in the 1990s, but the Solicitor General stressed that the FDA and the CDC 
would never allow the risks that Japan took by using the vaccine without adequate clinical trials. 
Japan was battling an epidemic of 13,000 whooping cough cases after removing the DPT 
Vaccine from the market. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 8, at 18–19; Brief for United States, 
supra note 36, at 33. 
 50. See supra notes 18–22 and accompanying text. 
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effective system than civil litigation in response to concerns of 
vaccine-injury victims and their families.51 Second, Congress sought to 
address the potential for massive liability that threatened the viability 
of the vaccine market—such liability reduced vaccine manufacturers’ 
ability to obtain insurance and substantially increased their legal 
costs.52 In the ten years prior to the enactment of the NVICP, the 
number of vaccine manufacturers shrank from twenty-six to just 
four.53 From 1980 to 1986, plaintiffs sued vaccine manufacturers for 
more than $3.5 billion in damages.54 Constant litigation threatened to 
jeopardize the supply of essential childhood vaccines in the country.55 
Congress passed the Vaccine Act in an effort to balance both the 
needs of the victims and vaccine providers. 
 The Vaccine Act contains an immunity provision, section 
300aa-22, which protects manufacturers from civil liability claims for 
“unavoidable” injuries.56 The statute, which is the source of 
controversy in this litigation, reads: 
No vaccine manufacturer shall be liable in a civil action for 
damages arising from a vaccine-related injury or death associated 
with the administration of a vaccine . . . if the injury or death 
resulted from side effects that were unavoidable even though the 
vaccine was properly prepared and was accompanied by proper 
directions and warnings.57 
In section (e), the statute denies federal preemption of any state 
claims that it does not expressly preempt.58 All parties agree that 
defective-manufacturing claims and failure-to-warn state claims are 
permitted under the Act,59 but whether the Vaccine Act preempts 
design-defect state claims is unclear. 
B. Federal Preemption in the FDA regulatory scheme 
Bruesewitz turns on the Court’s understanding of what in fact is 
preempted under the Vaccine Act. The federal government’s power to 
 
 51. H.R. REP. No. 99-908, at 4 (2006). 
 52. Id. at 4–5. 
 53. Brief for GSK, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 7, Bruesewitz v. 
Wyeth, No. 09-152 (U.S. July 23, 2010). 
 54. Id. at 7. 
 55. Id. at 7–8. 
 56. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300aa-22(b)(1) (West 2010). 
 57. Id. (emphasis added). 
 58. Id. 
 59. Brief for Respondent, supra note 5, at 46–47. 
DO NOT DELETE 1/31/2011  4:16:42 PM 
2011] THE “UNAVOIDABLE” VACCINE PROBLEM 99 
draft regulations that preempt state law is derived from the 
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution.60 Courts 
recognize three types of preemption: express, implied, and field.61 
Express preemption refers to preemption explicitly mentioned in the 
statutory text.62 Implied preemption is inferred if state law conflicts 
with federal law.63 Field preemption, a form of implied preemption, 
occurs when federal law occupies an area of the law so much that 
there is no room for further state regulation.64 All three forms of 
preemption require analysis of the statutory language and statutory 
scheme to determine whether Congress clearly and manifestly 
intended to preempt state law.65 If the relevant language is unclear, 
courts presume that federal law does not preempt state law.66 
Recently, the Supreme Court addressed express and implied 
federal preemption within the scope of the FDA-regulatory 
framework.67 In Riegel v. Medtronic,68 the Court held that the text of 
federal regulations preempted a New York negligence law that 
required a FDA-approved device to be safer than the FDA requires 
under the Medical Device Act (MDA).69 Because the MDA expressly 
preempts state laws “different from, or in addition to, any 
requirement applicable . . . to the device under federal law,” the Court 
held that the FDA pre-market safety approval requirement written in 
the MDA expressly preempts New York’s tort law.70 The majority 
emphasized that the text of the MDA only preempts state 
manufacturing defect and labeling rules, not design-defect claims, 
which were left unaddressed by the MDA.71 In reaching its conclusion, 
the Court deferred significantly to the FDA’s interpretation and relied 
 
 60. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; Hillsborough Cnty. v. Automated Med. Labs., 471 U.S. 707, 
713 (1985). 
 61. Hillsborough Cnty., 471 U.S. at 713. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, 561 F.3d 233, 243 (3d Cir. 2009). 
 66. Medtronic v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996). 
 67. See generally Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009) (holding that federal FDA 
regulations do not preempt state tort laws because FDA regulations do not prohibit stronger 
warning labels than approved); Riegel v. Medtronic, 555 U.S. 312 (2008) (finding that the 
Medical Device Act expressly preempted state tort law); Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 486–87 (denying 
that FDA regulations preempt state damages laws because they are not “different from” federal 
regulations under the Medical Device Act). 
 68. Riegel v. Medtronic, 555 U.S. 312 (2008). 
 69. Id. at 325. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 322–23. 
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heavily on statutory text of the MDA rather than its legislative 
history.72 
Conversely, in Wyeth v. Levine,73 the Court held that federal 
pharmaceutical labeling law does not implicitly preempt state law.74 
Because Wyeth could have substituted its label for a more stringent 
one without violating FDA regulations,75 the Wyeth Court held that 
the federal and state laws did not conflict,76 and thus the state law was 
not preempted.77 Adherence to FDA-approved warning labels is not 
sufficient because these labels serve as the low standard of adequate 
warnings; state juries, the Court held, can decide whether labels 
appropriately warned of risks above the FDA standard.78 The Court 
stressed that if the FDA intended to preempt state law, it could have 
included an express-preemption provision as it did in the MDA.79 
IV. HOLDING 
In Bruesewitz, the Third Circuit affirmed the lower court and 
concluded that section 22(b)(1) of the Vaccine Act expressly 
preempted design-defect claims given the legislative history and 
structure of the Act.80 If courts were forced to engage in a case-by-
case analysis to determine whether any vaccine’s side effects were 
unavoidable, then all claims would go to a jury, and section (e)’s 
preemption provision would be rendered meaningless.81 Additionally, 
the Third Circuit determined that the Act showed a “‘clear and 
manifest’ expression of congressional intent” to preempt design-
defect claims based on the 1986 House Commerce Committee 
Report.82 The court feared that allowing case-by-case evaluations of 
almost every vaccine-injury claim would defeat Congress’s intent to 
ensure the viability of the vaccine market.83 
 
 72. Id. at 326. 
 73. Wyeth v. Levine, 239 S. Ct. 1187 (2009). 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 1196–97. 
 76. Id. at 1199. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 1230–31 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 79. Id. at 1200 (majority opinion). 
 80. Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, 561 F.3d 233, 242, 255–56 (3d Cir. 2009). 
 81. Id. at 246. 
 82. Id. at 246–51. 
 83. Id. at 246. 
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V. ARGUMENTS 
The Supreme Court’s analysis of all statutes, even express 
preemption statutes, must begin with the statutory text.84 Both parties 
agree that this case rests on the Court’s interpretation of the word 
“unavoidable” in section 22(b).85 The Court likely will decide this 
issue by relying heavily on congressional intent and the policy 
implications of having state juries evaluate government public-health 
decisions. 
A.  Bruesewitz’s (Petitioner’s) Argument 
Bruesewitz argues that section 22(b) of the Vaccine Act holds 
vaccine manufacturers liable for vaccine-related injuries if the 
manufacturer could have designed a “safer alternative” to the 
vaccine.86 According to Bruesewitz, within the context of the Act 
“unavoidable” means that a manufacturer is liable if “the side effect 
could have been avoided by a safer design.”87 Citing the 1986 
Committee Report, Bruesewitz argues that section 22(b) only 
codified an exemption for strict-liability design-defect claims carved 
out as a common law tort in the Restatement of Torts.88 This clearly 
demonstrates that Congress had no intention of preempting vaccines 
from all design-related liability.89 Additionally, Bruesewitz cites 
several state and federal cases that have defined “unavoidably 
unsafe” as a product design that eliminates unnecessary risks of harm 
that cannot be made safer.90 By the time the Vaccine Act was adopted 
in 1986, “unavoidable” had adopted a specialized meaning in torts: 
safety risks that cannot be eliminated by a safer alternative design.91 
Bruesewitz argues that the conditional structure of section 22 
illustrates that the manufacturer must show “that the vaccine at issue 
 
 84. Id. at 239. 
 85. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 8, at 25; Brief for Respondent, supra note 5, at 24. 
 86. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 8, at 30–31. 
 87. Id. at 29 (citing the dictionary definition of “unavoidable” and the Restatement of 
Torts). 
 88. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 8, at 39. Products liability experts agree that section 
22(b) codifies comment K of the Restatement, which preempts only strict liability claims for 
manufacturers, not negligence claims. Brief for Ken Starr and Erwin Chemerinsky as Amici 
Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 18, Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, No. 09-152 (U.S. May 23, 2010); Brief 
of Mark Geistfeld, supra note 8, at 5–20. 
 89. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 8, at 50–51. 
 90. Id. at 30. 
 91. Id. at 30–31. 
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in the lawsuit was designed as safely as possible.”92 Otherwise, 
Congress would have used clearer language to overcome the 
presumption against preemption.93 For consistency with the plain 
text,94 Bruesewitz urges the Court to read the “even though” clause of 
the statute as preempting tort liability only if manufacturers have 
properly labeled and manufactured the vaccine and endured a case-
by-case analysis of the vaccine’s side effects.95 
Relying on committee reports and media statements by members 
of Congress at the time of and after the Act was passed, Bruesewitz 
contends that legislative history clearly shows that Congress did not 
intend to preempt state law.96 Bruesewitz points to the Energy and 
Commerce Committee’s rejection of a proposed amendment to 
immunize vaccine manufacturers from liability for failing to develop 
safer designs.97 Furthermore, the 1986 Committee Report stresses that 
the Vaccine Court should serve as an alternative to the tort system, 
not a replacement. 98 
Bruesewitz contends that permitting drug-manufacturer liability is 
consistent with both Congress’s intent in enacting the Vaccine Act and 
its policy goals.99 According to Bruesewitz, Congress intended to 
promote vaccine safety and ensure fair compensation to victims.100 If 
the law held manufacturers civilly liable, then manufacturers would be 
encouraged to improve their designs and injured patients would be 
properly compensated.101 Bruesewitz denies vaccine manufacturers’ 
contentions that increased liability would threaten the stability of the 
vaccine market, alluding to undefined and unsubstantiated profits 
that vaccines generate for manufacturers.102 
 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 39. 
 94. Id. at 41. 
 95. Id. at 35. 
 96. Id. at 44–51. 
 97. Id. at 45–46. 
 98. Id. at 47. 
 99. Id. at 51–57. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 54–55. 
 102. Reply Brief for Petitioners at 19, Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, No. 09-152 (U.S. Aug. 23, 2010). 
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B. Wyeth’s (Respondent’s) Arguments 
Wyeth argues that the Vaccine Act clearly preempts design-defect 
claims.103 The company contends that the relevant statutory language 
(“even though the vaccine was properly prepared”) modifies the 
definition of what it means for a vaccine’s side effect to be 
“unavoidable.” Bruesewitz, in contrast, argues that this language 
creates additional requirements the drug manufacturer must meet.104 
Wyeth asserts that Bruesewitz’s interpretation of the statutory text is 
a result of an alteration of Congress’s specific word choices—an 
alteration that misstates congressional intent. Wyeth notes that the 
Act says “side effects that were unavoidable even though . . . ,” not 
“unavoidable side effects even though . . . ,” as Bruesewitz interprets 
the language. This inversion of the statutory language, Wyeth 
contends, changes the Act’s meaning, which was intended to shield 
manufacturers from liability if they met their statutory obligations.105 
Bruesewitz, in contrast, interprets the Act to indemnify manufacturers 
from liability only if the vaccine’s side effects are unavoidable and the 
manufacturer fulfilled its additional legal obligations.106 
Wyeth stresses that the Vaccine Act provides mechanisms other 
than liability to ensure that the industry continues to work on 
producing safer vaccines—like making HHS responsible for 
promoting and ensuring vaccine-safety development.107 Allowing case-
by-case analyses would put that responsibility back into the hands of 
juries, which tend to overlook the social benefits of vaccines and focus 
only on the relatively small number of vaccine-related injuries.108 Thus, 
the Vaccine Act relies on HHS to determine the most effective and 
necessary vaccines rather than on an amalgam of state laws and jury 
verdicts.109 Recognizing that vaccines necessarily have side effects, 
Congress chose to compensate vaccine-injury victims through the 
Vaccine Court, rather than state court.110 Wyeth argues that a jury’s 
responsibilities should be limited to deciding manufacturing-defect 
claims, so as to not interfere with HHS and FDA responsibilities. 
 
 103. Brief for Respondent, supra note 5, at 29. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 32–33. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Brief for United States, supra note 36, at 31; Brief for Respondent, supra note 5, at 36. 
 108. Brief for Respondent, supra note 5, at 36–37. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 37. 
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Although Wyeth acknowledges that the Restatement of Torts may 
help elucidate whether Congress intended the Vaccine Act to preempt 
design-defect claims, it is not clear that the Restatement preempted 
only strict liability.111 Before Congress passed the Vaccine Act, some 
state courts had interpreted the relevant section of the Restatement 
of Torts to preempt both strict and negligence liability.112 Because both 
parties are calling for the preemption of some state common law, the 
presumption against preemption is moot.113 And it is also not clear 
that section 22(b) actually codified the exact restrictions in the 
Restatement rather than the principles it provides of manufacturer 
protection.114 
Finally, Wyeth refutes Bruesewitz’s main policy argument that 
manufacturer liability is essential to protect public health and ensure 
new vaccine developments.115 Since the 1986 enactment of the Vaccine 
Act, manufacturers have brought over twenty new vaccines to market 
even without liability for design-defect claims.116 Wyeth argues that 
design-defect claims do not inherently encourage more disclosure 
from manufacturers than a manufacturing-defect claim would (if 
there is any additional information to disclose).117 In assessing the 
vaccine market and enacting the Vaccine Act, Wyeth argues that 
Congress sought to improve and protect public health not through 
litigation, but by ensuring a ready supply of vaccines and preventing 
manufacturers from leaving the market.118 With design-defect liability, 
there would be an inevitable onslaught of litigation, which could have 
a devastating effect on public health.119 The Solicitor General also 
views the addition of tort claims as detrimental to the vaccine 
industry, and ultimately public health.120 
 
 111. Id. at 42. 
 112. Id. at 42–44. 
 113. Both parties are trying to preempt some state court decision with federal law 
interpretation. Bruesewitz wants to preempt state court decisions that interpret comment K in 
the Restatement of Torts as only preempting strict liability while Wyeth wants to preempt any 
state decision interpreting comment K as preempting strict and negligence liability. If there is a 
presumption against preemption, it should impact both parties equally. Therefore the 
presumption should not hurt or help either party. Id. at 45. 
 114. Id. at 42 n.24. 
 115. Id. at 53–57. 
 116. Id. at 28. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 53–57. 
 119. Id. at 57. 
 120. Id. at 24–25. 
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V. ANALYSIS 
Although Hannah Bruesewitz’s case is emotionally moving, the 
Court likely will find for Wyeth based on Wyeth’s policy rationale. 
Because the statutory text and congressional intent are unclear, the 
Court’s public policy preferences likely will determine the outcome of 
this case. 
Even though Wyeth’s public health argument is persuasive, Wyeth 
must first overcome the presumption against preemption. Notable law 
professors, including Ken Starr and Erwin Chemerinsky, argue that 
the Third Circuit disregarded this presumption, and thus the Court 
should reverse.121 Because the Vaccine Act does not contain a clear 
and manifest purpose to preempt categorically, and because 
Bruesewitz’s interpretation is equally plausible, Starr and 
Chemerinsky advocate the preservation of state law.122 If Congress 
intended to preempt design-defect claims, they argue, it would have 
used clearer language.123 Another distinguished law professor, Mark 
Geistfeld, also supports Bruesewitz’s interpretation based on the 
Restatement of Torts.124 Like Bruesewitz, Geistfeld argues that the 
Restatement’s liability exemption applies only to strict liability; 
negligence liability must remain to incentivize producers to eliminate 
unreasonably dangerous products from the market.125 That this 
scheme might threaten the vaccine market is a necessary consequence 
of tort law’s intent to promote product safety.126 Stressing the 
legislative history of the Act, Geistfeld argues that the Vaccine Act 
adopts the Restatement’s immunity for strict liability.127 
These arguments highlight Wyeth’s primary obstacle: where the 
text and legislative history are ambiguous, preemption should be 
avoided.128 Although the presumption against preemption is well-
 
 121. See generally Brief for Starr and Chemerinsky, supra note 88 (arguing that the 
principles of federalism require the presumption against preemption in this case). 
 122. Id. at 14–18. 
 123. Id. at 15. 
 124. See generally Brief for Mark Geistfeld, supra note 8 (explaining and applying the 
principles of comment K to the Vaccine Act). 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. at 6–7. 
 128. See supra notes 88 (contending that, despite Wyeth’s well-demonstrated arguments 
stating otherwise, the Vaccine Act’s legislative history clearly adopts the Restatement of Torts)  
and 121 (arguing that the Court should necessarily presume against preemption due to the lack 
of clarity in the Vaccine Act)and accompanying text. 
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established and generally followed,129 Congress stated that certain 
sections of the Act are not preempted.130 This suggests that Congress 
did intend for some parts to be preempted.131 Both parties provide 
plausible interpretations of the statutory language. But, as the Third 
Circuit points out, it would be unreasonable to find that nothing is 
preempted when section (e) clearly indicates that the Act preempts 
some state law.132 Though both liberal and conservative professors 
argue that any preemption in the Vaccine Act is too subtle to 
overcome the presumption against preemption, Wyeth could win the 
support of both liberal and conservative justices on this point. 
Conservative justices, like Justices Scalia and Alito, and Chief Justice 
Roberts, recently have found preemption in even less clear cases.133 
More liberal justices, like Justice Breyer, may find design-defect 
claims preempted based on the legislative history of the Act or based 
on the threat to public health. 
Despite Geistfeld’s arguments, the Vaccine Act’s legislative history 
does not mention an explicit adoption of the Restatement of Torts. 
Instead, a 1986 Committee Report expresses Congress’s intent to 
embrace the “principles” of the Restatement of Torts and does not 
distinguish between the Act’s preemption of strict and negligence 
liability.134 Congress could have extended the Restatement’s immunity 
from strict liability to negligence liability in an effort to safeguard the 
vaccine market, but the Committee Report and the Act are unclear.  
 
 
 129. See Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 449 (2005) (“In areas of traditional 
state regulation, [the Supreme Court] assume[s] that a federal statute has not supplanted state 
law unless Congress has made such an intention ‘clear and manifest.’”); see also City of 
Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 317 (1981) (stating that presumption requires “evidence of a 
clear and manifest purpose”); Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 
146–47 (1963) (“[W]e are not to conclude that Congress legislated [this] . . . in the absence of an 
unambiguous congressional mandate to that effect . . . .”). 
 130. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 300aa-22(e) (West 2010) (“No State may establish or enforce a law 
which prohibits an individual from bringing a civil action against a vaccine manufacturer for 
damages for a vaccine-related injury or death if such civil action is not barred by this part.”). 
 131. Id. 
 132. Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, 561 F.3d 233, 246 (3d Cir. 2009). 
 133. Riegel v. Medtronic, 555 U.S. 312, 312 (2008) (Scalia, J., majority opinion); Wyeth v. 
Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1217 (2009) (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 134. H. REP. No. 99-908, at 26 (1986) (“The Committee has set forth [c]omment K in this 
bill because it intends that the principle in [c]omment K regarding ‘unavoidably unsafe’ 
products, i.e., those products which in the present state of human skill and knowledge cannot be 
made safe, apply to the vaccines covered in the bill and that such products not be the subject of 
liability in the tort system.”). 
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As Wyeth demonstrates, the Restatement of Torts is not dispositive, as 
it does not directly discuss the Vaccine Act.135 
Although both parties have equally plausible readings of the 
statute, Bruesewitz’s definition of “unavoidable” renders its 
interpretation unreasonable. Under United States v. Kirby,136 the Court 
held that it avoids literal interpretations of statutes that lead to 
absurd consequences.137 Bruesewitz asks the Court to recognize that 
“unavoidable” had a special meaning as of 1986: “a product’s safety 
risks are ‘unavoidable’ only when they cannot be eliminated by a 
safer alternative design.”138 But any alternative design is inherently a 
different product than that approved by the FDA, as any modification 
to a design yields a new vaccine.139 Bruesewitz’s definition would lead 
to an absurd consequence: it would hold manufacturers liable for 
injuries if an alternative product could exist and manufacturers did 
not implement it, even if the manufacturer does not have the licenses 
or the ability to produce the alternative product. During oral 
arguments, Justice Kennedy noted that Bruesewitz’s interpretation 
would afford drug manufacturers even less protection than before 
Congress passed the Vaccine Act.140 Moreover, Bruesewitz demands 
“safer” vaccines, but ignores the real consequence that fewer side 
effects may result in less effective vaccines.141 Bruesewitz essentially 
asks the Court to regulate the choice of products a manufacturer 
produces—a task that the government agrees should only be 
performed by experts, doctors, and the FDA.142 
Contrary to Bruesewitz’s claims, imposing tort liability likely 
would do little to improve safety, as manufacturers control very little 
of the process involved in researching and developing vaccines.143 
HHS tightly regulates the vaccine development process and the NIH 
 
 135. Brief for Respondent, supra note 5, 40–41. 
 136. United States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. 482 (1866). 
 137. Id. at 486 (“All laws should receive a sensible construction. General terms should be so 
limited in their application as not to lead to injustice, oppression, or an absurd consequence . . . 
.”). 
 138. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 8, at 30–31. 
 139. Brief for United States, supra note 36, at 32–33. 
 140. Transcript of Oral Argument at 14, 16–17, Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, No. 09-152 (2010). 
 141. Brief for United States, supra note 36, at 31 (“Guaranteeing that a vaccine is potent 
enough to ensure that a disease is contained or eradicated in this way entails trade-offs between 
safety and potency.”). 
 142. Id. at 19–23. 
 143. Id.  
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actually performs much of the research.144 The federal government 
weighs the risks and benefits of all of the available vaccines and 
recommends a specific vaccine for routine administration based on 
societal benefit.145 In 1992 it recommended only Wyeth’s DPT 
vaccine.146 Furthermore, most of the amici advocating tort law to 
improve vaccine safety express great dissatisfaction with the Vaccine 
Court and updates to the Table.147 This is not an issue that should be 
addressed in this case; though the Vaccine Act and its injury table may 
be significantly out of date, failures on the part of Congress and HHS 
are not adequate reasons to impose additional liability on 
manufacturers. 
As most of the medical professional amici agree, Wyeth’s policy 
argument that immunity avoids market collapse and more effectively 
prevents outbreaks is more persuasive than Bruesewitz’s argument 
that tort liability strengthens the vaccine market.148 While Bruesewitz 
denies that this is a serious problem, vaccine manufacturing is 
inherently costly and yields very little financial rewards for 
companies—their biggest customer is the government which receives 
vaccines at reduced costs.149 When the Vaccine Act was created, 
vaccine manufacturers faced lawsuits for DPT-related injuries from 
plaintiffs seeking more than thirty times the market value of the DPT 
vaccine.150 Expert scientists and doctors agree that immunizing 
vaccines from liability is the best way to prevent the vaccine market 
from collapsing.151 And due to the reputation of these amici, most 
notably the American Academy of Pediatrics, their arguments 
probably will weigh heavily in the justices’ minds when they make 
their decision.152 
 
 144. Id. 
 145. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 140, at 41, 48–51. 
 146. Id. at 48–53. 
 147. See e.g., Brief for Marguerite Willner as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, at 20–
31, Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, No. 09-152 (May 24, 2010) (arguing that the Table injuries are 
incomplete); Brief of Vaccine Injured Petitioners Bar Association, et al. as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Petitioners, at 9–18, Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, No. 09-152 (May 24, 2010) (arguing that 
the vaccine compensation system is not working.). 
 148. See Brief of AAP, supra note 7, at 23–27; Brief of 11 Scientists, supra note 41, at 20. 
 149. Id. at 11–12. 
 150. Id. at 13. 
 151. See Brief of AAP, supra note 7, at 9–10; see also Brief for 11 Scientists, supra note 41, at 
15. 
 152. Justice Breyer expressed his trust in the American Academy of Pediatrics’ policy 
evaluation in contrast to statements he has made in prior opinions. Transcript of Oral 
Argument, supra note 140, at 16. 
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Based on the dissents in other preemption cases it is likely this 
case will split 5-3 for Wyeth.153 Wyeth likely has the support of at least 
Justices Alito and Scalia and Chief Justice Roberts based on the tenor 
of their dissent in Wyeth v. Levine and the nature of their questioning 
and comments during Bruesewitz’s oral arguments.154 Justices 
Ginsburg and Thomas have made their views of policy and statutory 
interpretation apparent. Justice Ginsburg voted against preemption in 
a much more straightforward express-preemption case,155 and Justice 
Thomas consistently votes in favor of strict adherence to the 
presumption against preemption when clear language does not 
indicate otherwise.156 Justice Breyer’s concern for the vaccine market 
and Justice Kennedy’s apprehension about the expense of litigation157 
both lean in favor of Wyeth. Justice Sotomayor’s position remains 
unclear, but during oral arguments she indicated a distrust of 
government oversight of the vaccine industry.158 
Given the evidence indicating Congress’s intent to protect the 
vaccine market and the support of medical professionals for vaccine 
companies in this case, Wyeth ultimately seems poised to win. While 
scientists and doctors understand that no vaccine is completely safe, 
most agree that it is still safer to take one than not.159 And even those 
who do not take the vaccine benefit from them: herd immunity 
prevents epidemics and widespread disease.160 Therefore, there is a 
strong societal and public welfare interest in preserving the vaccine 
market. Too often juries overlook the public welfare arguments and 
see only the tragic story before them. As Justice Scalia wrote, “[a] jury 
. . . sees only the cost of a more dangerous design, and is not 
concerned with its benefits; the patients who reaped those benefits 
are not represented in court.”161 This thought concerned even Justice 
Ginsburg, the lone dissent in Riegel v. Medtronic,162 who asked 
Bruesewitz “if there’s a safer alternative, it must be pursued 
 
 153. Justice Kagan will take no part in this decision due to her previous role as Solicitor 
General. 
 154. Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1217 (2009) (Alito, J., joined by Scalia, J., and 
Roberts, C.J., dissenting). See also Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 140, at 5–11. 
 155. Riegel v. Medtronic, 552 U.S. 312, 333 (2008) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 156. Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1205 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 157. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 140, at 24. 
 158. Id. at 30–32. 
 159. Brief for AAP, supra note 7, at 15. 
 160. Brief for 11 Scientists, supra note 41, at 11–12. 
 161. Riegel v. Medtronic, 552 U.S. 312, 325 (2008). 
 162. Id. at 333 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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regardless of costs?”163 While the decision in this case should turn only 
on the Court’s interpretation of the Vaccine Act, the Court cannot 
and likely will not overlook the policy implications when it votes in 
Wyeth’s favor. 
 
 
 163. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 140, at 14. 
